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 The Good, the Right, and the Lawyer 
 
Trevor CW Farrow* 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Most legal ethics scholars have seen it: the cartoon depicting a lawyer standing at a crossroads 
with a two-way directional sign indicating ‘legal’ to the left and ‘moral’ to the right. The 
caption on the cartoon simply reads: ‘how to stump a … lawyer’.1 In a simple, but powerful 
(and humorous) way, the cartoon essentially depicts the fundamental question that has 
traditionally divided legal ethics scholars into two basic camps: those who think that, in 
addition to (or notwithstanding) the law, lawyers can or should be guided by some sense of 
personal or communal morality when doing their clients’ work; and those who do not.2 
This question can be asked in several different ways and from several different 
perspectives. Broadly put, should the lawyer be guided by her own sense of what is 
ethical, moral, just or good; or should she essentially be neutral to those moral or other 
issues in favour of simply following her client’s instructions within the boundaries set out 
by the law? Put in theoretical terms more familiar to debates between liberalism3 or 
libertarianism4 on the one hand and communitarianism5 (for example) on the other: is the 
good prior to the right when it comes to lawyers and the work they do for their clients? And 
in terms of basic legal ethics theory, the question boils down to this: by what standard 
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 should lawyers ultimately be guided when answering the question of how they should act: 
the law only, or the law and something else? The purpose of this essay is to look critically at 
this set of questions, which can, for the  sake of simplicity, be collapsed as follows: is there 
a role for moral pluralism—or morality at all—in legal ethics thinking? In so doing, I 
have essentially two main goals. First, I contextualise this discussion by very briefly looking 
at the leading conceptions of the lawyering role that have unsuccessfully grappled with these 
issues to date. Second (and here is the main purpose of this essay), I look at a new attempt 
to address these issues that is provided by Bradley Wendel in his recent book Lawyers and 
Fidelity to Law. While providing an extremely elegant and admirable argument, I ultimately 
conclude that Wendel’s account is an insufficient account of the lawyering role. Through 
this discussion, I provide a few comments on my own theory of why the lawyering role 
must take into account some vision of the good (in addition to the right). And while 
notions of the good can include various aspects of justice, ethics, morality, religion, and so 
forth, I primarily look at how the lawyering role must take into account something more 
than law (contemplated by the right), which—again for the sake of simplicity—amounts 
to something akin to a sense of morality that is animated by visions (albeit potentially 
contested visions) of justice. Having said that, the purpose of this essay is not to develop my 
own theory of lawyering, which I have sought to do elsewhere.6 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF THE LAWYERING ROLE 
 
Dominant Models of Lawyering 
What has come to be known as the standard or dominant conception of the lawyer’s role 
answers the question of whether morality has a part to play in the lawyering role essentially 
 in the negative. On this view, lawyers are to be guided by what the law deems to be relevant 
in the context of their client’s interests.7 Further, what a lawyer thinks personally about a 
client’s case—in the words of Alberta’s former Code of Professional Conduct—is ‘essentially 
irrelevant’.8 
 
This view of the lawyering role fits with an Enlightenment sensibility that, in liberal 
democracies governed by a strong sense of procedural justice, the plurality of individual 
interests and preferences of a citizenry must be trumped by an overriding and 
collective democratic requirement for the supremacy of the rule of law. Because society 
cannot (and likely should not) possibly agree on what Aristotle sought to articulate as the 
‘good life’ for each of its members, particularly in an increasingly globalised and morally 
pluralistic world, society has brokered a boundary—typically in the form of the law9—
that provides the outer limit around the space within which people can otherwise freely 
pursue their own individual notions of the good. Liberal democratic theorists and legal 
positivists take the view that the role of law is essentially to frame a landscape in which fair 
contests of rights and interests can take place. Formal institutional structures are put in place to 
regulate the relationships and distributional choices of citizens in social life. For example, 
according to Joseph Raz: 
 
The law provides the general framework within which social life takes place. It is a system for 
guiding behavior and for settling disputes which claims supreme authority to interfere in any kind 
of activity. It also regularly either supports or restricts the creation and practice of other norms in 
the society. By making these claims the law claims to provide the general framework for the 
conduct of all aspects of social life and sets itself up as the supreme guardian of society.10 
  
Similarly, according to John Rawls, ‘the law defines the basic structure within which the 
pursuit of all other activities takes place’.11 A procedurally robust, but substantively limited 
(or neutral) institutional framework for the operation of society is a pre-condition to the 
peaceful coexistence and flourishing of a pluralistic society in which each individual member 
can pursue their own needs, wants and dreams. Put simply, on these various liberal 
theories,12 the right is prior to the good.13 As such, and coming back to the lawyer’s role, 
what guides the lawyer’s actions must be what the law provides in terms of legitimate 
(legal) client interests. Clients need to be free to pursue all that they want and are entitled to, 
provided that by so doing, they stay within the confines of the law. 
 
Alternative Models of Lawyering 
Alternative models of professionalism have developed in opposition to this standard 
conception. The basic reason for the disquiet of these alternative models is simple: the act 
of realising on a given client’s interests, however legal, does not always fit squarely 
with a lawyer’s individual (or society’s collective) sense of ethics or morality (the ‘good’). 
And further, who is to say that a client’s interests should be privileged in society over those of 
other legitimate rights holders, particularly in situations in which the client has the 
advantage of legal representation and other interested individuals or groups do not?14 On these 
views, client interests should not be seen in such a sacrosanct light. And further, from the 
lawyer’s perspective, simply taking on the role of advocate should not absolve the lawyer of 
the personal responsibility (or opportunity) associated with the outcome of the 
lawyer’s actions on behalf of a client. For example, assisting a manufacturer to stretch its 
 allowable toxic effluent to the very limits of an arguably allowable—although 
aggressive—reading of environmental protection standards may fit with the law as it 
currently stands, but it may be at odds with what the lawyer thinks is good for herself, for 
the community (and potentially also for the client). And bracketing the relevance of that 
personal view diminishes the potential of the lawyering role to do good things in society 
(of course with the knowledge of and instruction from the client—nothing in these 
theories advocates the unprofessional undermining of client interests).15 
Like their dominant counterparts, these alternative views of the lawyering role also find 
purchase in the same codes of conduct that have traditionally defined the standard 
conception of the lawyering role. For example, the FLSC’s Model Code of Professional 
Conduct prohibits an advocate from knowingly assisting a client to do anything that the 
lawyer considers to be ‘dishonourable’.16 The ABA Model Rules go further, providing that 
a lawyer is guided by ‘personal conscience’, and further, that when representing a client, a 
lawyer ‘may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, 
social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation’.17 Similarly, the 
revised version of Alberta’s code, which formerly rendered the advocate’s own view of a 
client’s case ‘essentially irrelevant’, continues to provide that, when deciding on an 
appropriate course of action for a client, a lawyer ‘may find it necessary to … consider 
general moral principles …’.18 
 
Lawyers at the Crossroads 
Generalising, the dominant models bracket morality in deference to the law’s overriding 
guiding hand when it comes to the lawyer’s role. Alternative models typically reject this 
 moral indifference to the outcome of the lawyer’s daily efforts on behalf of the client. And the 
codes of conduct that purport to sustain both accounts do not provide a clear answer, on their 
face, on how to resolve the apparent conflict. So where does that leave us? One answer to this 
question is that we are at an impasse. That is the answer envisaged by the cartoon of the 
lawyer at the crossroads described at the outset of this essay.19 But that is not a helpful 
answer in terms of providing lawyers with any meaningful guidance on how to act, or by 
what yardstick they could potentially evaluate their conduct. Another answer is that we need a 
different form of professionalism, which is what I sought to develop in my 2008 ‘Sustainable 
Professionalism’ article.20 Another answer is offered through a different approach to 
lawyering, which has been provided by Brad Wendel. It is to that account that I now turn in 
the second (main) part of this essay. 
 
FIDELITY TO LAW: A NECESSARY BUT INSUFFICIENT ACCOUNT 
 
Strengths of the Theory 
In his recent book Lawyers and Fidelity to Law, Brad Wendel provides a very powerful and 
comprehensive account of legal professionalism. In this account, Wendel essentially adopts 
a standard—dominant—conception of the lawyering role. He is guided by a vision of 
professionalism that requires a bracketing of the lawyer’s personal moral preferences in 
the context of carrying out a client’s legal work. His reason for doing so is very much 
guided by the liberal—Enlightenment—view of society that was articulated above.21 Put in 
professional terms, this understanding of society leaves clients free to define their own 
notions of what counts as good or just, provided that the results of such deliberations 
obtain within the bounds of the law. The lawyer’s role, on this theory, is to seek to promote 
 their client’s ability to enjoy this deliberative enterprise. 
However, notwithstanding that Wendel adopts liberalism as a fundamental animating 
principle behind his theory of lawyering, he does so with one very important distinction. 
Rather than privileging their client’s interests, Wendel makes it clear that his vision of the 
lawyering role requires that lawyers should act to protect their client’s legal entitlements (6). 
In this way, Wendel distances himself subtly, although importantly, from a vision of lawyers 
zealously swinging in the winds of their client’s chosen interests. No longer is the client’s 
interest the driving force behind the lawyer’s role. Rather, it is the right to which the client 
is entitled—democratically provided through society’s properly functioning institutional 
legal arrangements—that now acts as the ultimate engine that drives the lawyering enterprise. 
By linking the lawyer’s role, the client’s legal entitlements, and the democratically created 
institutional arrangements by which those entitlements are forged, the lawyer becomes, for 
Wendel, an important part of the political process upon which modern rule of law-based 
democracies are premised. Lawyers are better seen, according to Wendel, not as ordinary 
moral agents, but rather as analogous to ‘political officials’ (8) or ‘quasi-political actors’ (11). 
As such, their job is ultimately to promote the legal entitlements of their clients, not to 
moralise about those entitlements. However, although taking a morally neutral stance with 
respect to their client’s entitlements, given the social value played by lawyers, Wendel is of 
the view that the lawyering role has ‘moral value’ (11). In this sense, Wendel recognises the 
institutional moral worth of the lawyering enterprise (as a system), as opposed to any moral 
deliberation at the day-to-day client level in the context of individual retainers. This view 
accords with Rob Atkinson’s general description of the morality at play for the typical 
dominant view of lawyering (what he describes, below, as ‘neutral partisanship’): 
 
 [When] proponents of neutral partisanship describe their model as amoral, they are not referring 
to its ultimate grounding, which is emphatically moral. They are referring, rather, to the lawyer’s 
immunity from the task of scrutinizing the morality of particular client acts. Theirs is the morality 
at the wholesale but not the retail level; a morality of the long run, not the particular case; a 
morality of fidelity to role obligations, not attention to particular acts.22 
 
Wendel’s version of the dominant model of lawyering has much to commend it. First, his shift 
from interests to entitlements seems to add significant value in terms of concerns raised 
earlier by the alternative models of lawyering about the potential moral vacuum caused by 
a purely interest-based vision of the lawyer-client relationship.23 By promoting 
entitlements, he lends further credibility—through institutional legitimacy—to the 
various interests and courses of action that clients seek to pursue. He therefore avoids some of 
the very worst examples of lawyering outcomes in which clients pursue interests at the 
unfortunate or improper expense of others (perhaps through unjustifiable legal loopholes, 
mistakes, exercises of raw power, etc) (ch 2). Second, his theory also fits with current liberal 
democratic notions of governance, in which citizens can (at least in theory) expect to receive 
certain entitlements under the law, the making of which (again at least in theory) those 
citizens participated in through various democratic institutional procedures.24  This entitlement 
theory is therefore legitimised by its own liberal democratic underpinnings. Third, his theory 
also purports to provide the lawyer with a coherent set of rules by which to act. What the law 
says is legal is what the lawyer should be guided by—nothing more and nothing less. 
Although some moral deliberation is possible within the defined territory of the law (54), 
there is no need to descend into the messiness of moral pluralism, which—according to 
Wendel’s dominant model—cannot possibly provide the lawyer with a coherent set of 
 guidelines by which predictably to operate in any given retainer. The theory is therefore not 
only consistent with the political philosophy that it backstops, it is also internally consistent 
with the product of the institutional arrangements that it seeks to protect—namely the law. 
Through its external and internal consistency, Wendel’s theory purports to provide lawyers 
with a coherent blueprint by which to provide an answer—in essentially every case—to the 
basic lawyering question: ‘How should I act?’ 
 
Problems with the Theory 
So with all of these purported strengths, what is the problem? In my view, there are really two 
fundamental concerns with Wendel’s theory. The first is an operational concern. By seeking 
a coherent theory of lawyering, while attractive for its promise of universal prescription, 
Wendel ultimately does more harm than good. His theory provides a necessary, although 
not a sufficient guide for lawyers. I have no problem with the notion that client 
entitlements (or interests for that matter) are to be operationalised within the bounds of the 
law. Rule of lawbased societies require at least that kind of fidelity to the law. However, by 
taking a robust notion of moral deliberation off the table in the context of the lawyer-client 
relationship, Wendel does not provide lawyers with an adequate theory to make sense of 
their clients’ entitlements. 
What Wendel has done is essentially both to download and upload the role of moral 
deliberation in the context of lawyers, clients and society. On his theory, lawyers download to 
their clients the responsibility of deliberating about the morality of choices surrounding 
individual arrangements and exercises of power. Further, lawyers upload to judges, 
politicians and other public officials the responsibility to deliberate about the morality of 
 collective choices and institutional arrangements in the public lawmaking sphere. Of course 
in theory this institutional moral disaggregation makes sense. It fits with the basic 
democratic law making structure in which it operates. And it relieves the lawyer of 
responsibility for the moral outcome of their client’s causes. However, there is a fatal 
flaw to its logic. Given law’s indeterminate nature, I do not think that it is possible (or 
desirable for that matter) to relieve the lawyer from occupying the residual moral space that 
remains in the context of interpreting laws for the benefit of advising clients—at the individual 
client (‘retail’) level. If the law were perfectly determinate, then we would not need to 
worry. However, it is not a controversial statement to say that law is not determinate. It is 
often fluid, open-textured, unpredictable and even internally inconsistent at times. If there is a 
25 mile per hour residential speed limit, why can an ambulance drive faster than that? Or 
more simply, and elegantly, what does it mean to prohibit vehicles in the park?25 Most 
theorists agree that many laws are clear on their face. And to the extent that they are not, 
typically core and marginal (or exceptional) interpretations can be readily determined. 
However, there are other laws that, by their nature, require a heavier amount of 
interpretation and—potentially—moral deliberation in order adequately to understand and 
apply them in any given context. What does it mean for a corporate director to act in the 
‘best interests of the corporation’? Do those interests include financial interests, 
environmental interests (individual and collective), labour interests, equality interests, etc? If 
so, how are they to be balanced? What if they conflict? On its face the dictate is unclear. 
Context and interpretation matter.26 Similarly, what does it mean to negotiate in ‘good 
faith’? What is a ‘reasonable’ contractual term? 
These sorts of laws and rules do not just allow, they require a certain level of normative 
(often including moral) engagement on the part of legal counsel in order for clients 
 properly to understand their entitlements and for lawyers properly to understand how to 
advise on those entitlements. In fact, modern codes of conduct contemplate this kind of 
moral deliberation and engagement. For example, the ABA Model Rules provide that: 
 
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer’s responsibilities to 
clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical person while 
earning a satisfactory living … Within the framework of these Rules … many difficult issues of 
professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of 
sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules 
… 
The Rules do not … exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for 
no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules …27 
 
And further, as we saw earlier, the ABA Model Rules also provide that a lawyer may refer to 
various considerations, including ‘moral’ factors, when advising a client.28 Similarly, in 
Canada, the FLSC’s Model Code of Professional Conduct provides that (in the specific context 
of  organisational clients): 
 
[L]awyers as the legal advisers to organizations are in a central position to encourage organizations 
to comply with the law and to advise that it is in the organization’s and the public’s interest that 
organizations do not violate the law. Lawyers acting for organizations are often in a position to 
advise the executive officers of the organization, not only about the technicalities of the law, but 
also about the public relations and public policy concerns that motivated the government or 
regulator to enact the law. Moreover, lawyers for organizations, particularly in-house counsel, 
may guide organizations to act in ways that are legal, ethical, reputable and consistent with the 
organization’s responsibilities to its constituents and to the public.29 
  
Wendel would likely take no issue with these provisions, conceding that—within the bounds 
of the law—lawyers are free to engage in a moral dialogue with their clients, who according 
to Wendel, do not necessarily have any less (or more) moral training or authority than 
lawyers.30 However, he would stop at the point at which the lawyer reaches the boundary of 
the law. And my point is that, in many cases, finding that boundary is not an easy task, and 
in many cases it requires a very active and deliberate moral conversation. As such, in all but 
the very clearest of cases (involving the clearest of laws), morality is not incidental, but is 
rather central, to the lawyering role. It is in that sense that fidelity to law is a necessary part 
of the lawyering role; but it is far from a sufficient condition of the lawyering role. Without 
this kind of moral engagement, lawyers will be less able fully to understand and advise on 
the entitlements to which their clients lay claim. Lawyering is about more than simply 
formal rule application; it is very often much more about active and engaged moral 
deliberation. My second main concern with Wendel’s theory goes beyond this operational 
challenge  and looks at its underlying (and problematic) normative assumption. For 
Wendel’s theory to work, law, and the entitlements it creates, must be based on what he calls 
‘lawful power’, which he distinguished from ‘raw power’ (2).31 Raw power (or power that 
‘just is’), according to Wendel, provides that ‘those who possess it can do nasty things to 
other people’ (60). Lawful power, in contrast, provides that ‘those who are subjects of 
legitimate authority have a reason to do what the authority asks of them, apart from the 
fear of being subjected to unpleasant consequences’ (60). As such, laws, and the 
entitlements they create, are legitimate and worthy of fidelity on the part of lawyers to the 
extent that those laws and entitlements are created pursuant to exercises of lawful power. 
On its face, this aspect of Wendel’s theory appears sound. However, on a closer look, it 
 becomes quite problematic—for the simple reason that exercises of lawful power and raw 
power are not so easily distinguished, at least not on present day social conditions. I do not 
think it controversial to say that society, in large measure, is driven by money and power. Again 
put very simply, clients and lawmakers are typically (although perhaps not always) driven by 
money and the power and influence of interest groups. Of course there are nuances and 
exceptions. But the core of these statements is clearly true on any fair reading of society. One 
only needs to look at the inequities that surround us on a daily basis, about which the 
Occupy Movement so powerfully and recently reminded the world. If we did have a society in 
which access to law and politics was truly equal, then maybe we could legitimately bracket raw 
power from lawful power. But we don’t. And we won’t for some time (if ever). Those with 
money and those with power are those that primarily wield the tools of power (both 
legitimate and otherwise). 
And here is where lawyers enter the discussion again. Lawyers play an increasingly 
significant role in what law gets made, how it gets made, and how its fruits (entitlements) 
are distributed. As Roberto Unger has commented, 
 
[I]n the relatively deenergized democracies of today much of the controversy over the basic 
structure of social life, driven out from the arena of government-centered politics, passes into the 
hands of the professions … under the disguise of technical expertise. It matters how the 
professions relate to the citizenry and how the discourse and practice of each profession 
suppresses or exhibits transformative opportunity in social life.32 
 
Given that lawyers—particularly in jurisdictions with self-regulatory regimes—have a 
monopoly over the provision of these important legal services, the discussion about how law 
is made and how it gets deployed cannot take place on a value neutral basis. Otherwise, social 
 inequity will be perpetually continued. Justice will become less, not more, accessible to 
more groups in society—particularly those at the margins. To the extent that making justice 
accessible forms part of the bargain of self-regulated professionals, a theory of lawyering that 
simply distributes power to power cannot be sustained. For example, in Ontario, in exchange 
for the privilege of self-regulation, the Law Society of Upper Canada has taken on a ‘duty’ 
to ‘act so as to facilitate access to justice …’.33 Wendel’s theory is inconsistent not only with 
what lawyers should do, but with what lawyers—at least in Ontario—have collectively 
promised to do in the context of promoting access to justice. Further, not only have Ontario 
lawyers collectively promised to facilitate ‘access’ to justice, they have also taken on an 
equally powerful duty to ‘maintain and advance the cause of justice and the rule of law’.34 
Wendel’s theory is certainly, as we have seen, consistent with the second part of that 
promise. There is no doubt that fidelity to law promotes the rule of law. However, if the duty 
were just about protecting legal entitlements, based on typical rules of statutory 
interpretation, the word ‘justice’ would not have been included in this statutory mandate. 
Because it was, the word ‘justice’ must mean something more. And to me, what it means is 
that more is at stake than simply a thin notion of operational legal protection. Although 
perhaps aspirational in nature (at least in practice, although not on its face), what this 
statutory promise requires is a more robust vision of lawyering that takes seriously not only 
the legal rules by which it operates, but also the justice of its output. Put simply, more is at 
stake than the basic requirement of fidelity to law. Through consistent and considered moral 
deliberation, lawyers are engaged in a much grander enterprise—not only the protection of 
the rule of law, but also the creation of a just society. 
 
 Two Potential Counterarguments 
Before I conclude, I will now discuss two counterarguments that I anticipate might be 
raised about my comments in this essay. First, a question might be raised as to how we can 
regulate deliberations about justice in a liberal democracy. My initial answer is quite simple: 
we can’t, other than to say that deliberations about justice must be conducted professionally 
and in good faith. I recognise that this answer lacks the desired internal coherence that 
Wendel seeks to promote with his theory. I am OK with that. Because given the 
indeterminacy of law, I do not think that Wendel, in the end, successfully provides any more 
coherence than I do. Neither law nor justice is a determinate concept. Pretending that they are 
cheapens both the process by which lawyers operate as well as the normative content of the 
fruits of their labour. Rather, we must embrace the moral aspect of the lawyering role, 
provide lawyers with as much guidance and courage on how to engage in this powerful 
enterprise, and then to the extent that they get it wrong, seek to educate, regulate and—
if necessary—castigate in appropriate circumstances. That is the best we can do. And to 
me, that is a good thing. 
Second, by welcoming moral engagement on the part of lawyers, will we not be 
opening the door to a tyranny of lawyers who will refuse to take on unpopular clients and 
causes? To date, this has not proven to be a significant problem. However, to the extent that 
we are successful with efforts increasingly to diversify the bar, which is reflective of an 
increasingly pluralistic society, what counts as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘just’, ‘unjust’, ‘moral’ or 
‘immoral’ will necessarily very much depend on the eye of the beholder. Notions of 
ethics, morality and justice will be seen as differently by a diverse bar as they are by a 
diverse client base. That is also a good thing. As I mentioned earlier, provided the deliberative 
lawyering role is exercised professionally and in good faith, within the bounds of the law, 
 then a plurality of moral perspectives at the lawyering level will reflect the fabric of a vibrant 
and morally diverse society. Further, individual lawyers need to understand the diverse moral 
perspectives of their clients and be able to engage, at different levels and from different 
perspectives, with this fundamental lawyering requirement. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Calls for lawyers not only to be competent, but to do good in society, are not new. As 
Martin Mayer stated decades ago: 
 
[I]f lawyers cannot look at the society as a whole and say that certain aspects of their work … 
represent a plus for this society and for the world of our children, then … lawyers should try to 
find a way to salvage what is worth doing out of their work and be influential in the production of 
what is going to happen next.35 
 
More recently, similar sentiments were raised by Canada’s Governor General: 
 
[H]ow do we craft a new definition of the lawyer as professional? … We enjoy a monopoly to 
practise law. In return, we are duty bound to serve our clients competently, to improve justice and 
to continuously create the good. That’s the deal … For many today, the law is not accessible, save 
for large corporations and desperate people at the low end of the income scale … We must engage 
our most innovative thinking to redefine professionalism and regain our focus on serving the 
public…36 
 
Being part of the solution, not part of the problem, is consistent with what many people want 
 (and expect) from the lawyering role: students, judges, many clients and lawyers themselves. 
Lawyers not only want to be competent, they typically also want to do good.37 And here we 
arrive back where we started: the lawyer at the crossroads. But rather than being faced with 
an either/or choice, lawyers need to have a command of, and an ability to use, both: that which 
is legal and that which is moral. Put differently, the lawyer needs access to both the good and 
the right. Wendel is correct that lawyers need to demonstrate fidelity to the law. And seeing 
this fidelity in terms of entitlements rather than interests is, in my view, a significant advance 
in terms of the dominant theory of lawyering. However, fidelity to law, while necessary, is not 
a sufficient condition of lawyering. Lawyers also need the space and ability to roll up their 
sleeves and get into the moral muck of their retainers. Only then can lawyers start to achieve 
not only a fidelity to law, but also a fidelity to justice. And to the extent that lawyers are 
playing an increasingly powerful role in the way that law is developed and deployed, seeing 
the lawyering role in this way is becoming increasingly important for the wellbeing of both 
the profession and society. 
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